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Abstract. Consider two principles for social evaluation. The
rst, `laissez-faire', says that mean-preserving redistribution away
from laissez-faire incomes should be regarded as a social wors-
ening. This principle captures a key aspect of liberal political
philosophy. The second, weak Pareto, states that an increase
in each individual's disposable income should be regarded as a
social improvement. We show that the combination of the two
principles implies that total disposable income ought be maxi-
mized. Strikingly, the relationship between disposable incomes
and laissez-faire incomes must therefore be ignored, leaving little
room for liberal values.
Keywords. Laissez-faire  Pareto  Libertarianism  Equal sacrice taxation
 Liberal reward
JEL classication. D63
We thank Bart Capeau, Marc Fleurbaey, Jean-Jacques Herings, Francois Maniquet,
Erwin Ooghe and Erik Schokkaert for useful comments. All remaining shortcomings are
ours.
E-mail addresses: k.bosmans@maastrichtuniversity.nl  emel.ozturk@glasgow.ac.uk
1
1 Introduction
Libertarianism ascribes intrinsic value to laissez-faire outcomes. Proponents
of this political philosophy accordingly regard redistributive taxation as an
inherent injustice. For example, Nozick (1974, p. 169) states that \[t]axation
of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor. : : : taking the earnings
of n hours labor is like taking n hours from the person; it is like forcing the
person to work n hours for another's purpose." The respect for laissez-faire
outcomes is not restricted to the `rightward' extreme of the liberal spec-
trum. It is a component also of egalitarian liberalism, which disapproves
redistribution to redress inequalities resulting from the exercise of personal
responsibility.1
We introduce a `laissez-faire' principle to capture the above ethical role
for laissez-faire outcomes. To do so, we distinguish between an individual's
`market income' without government intervention and her `disposable in-
come' after government intervention. Consider a social state in which dis-
posable incomes coincide with market incomes. The laissez-faire principle
simply says that redistribution that moves disposable incomes away from
market incomes (while preserving total income) results in a socially worse
social state.
We show that the laissez-faire principle, when combined with the Pareto
principle, puts strong demands on the social ranking. According to the `weak
Pareto' principle, an increase in the disposable income (which we assume to
measure utility) of every individual is a social improvement. Our main result
says that a social ranking satises laissez-faire and weak Pareto only if it
maximizes total disposable income (Theorem 1). That is, with the exception
of comparisons involving equal total disposable incomes, the social ranking
must ignore distributional considerations altogether. The result is striking,
1As Arneson (1990, p. 176) puts it, \distributive justice does not recommend any
intervention by society to correct inequalities that arise through the voluntary choice or
fault of those who end up with less, so long as it is proper to hold the individuals responsible
for the voluntary choice or faulty behavior that gives rise to the inequalities." Inequalities
arising from other sources do call for redistribution according to egalitarian liberalism.
See also Dworkin (1981), Rawls (1982) and Cohen (1989).
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as it is counter to treating the relationship between disposable incomes and
market incomes as intrinsically important. We further show that there is
no social ranking that satises the laissez-faire principle and the `Pareto
indierence' principle (Theorem 2).
Our results reveal a strong tension between the laissez-faire principle and
the Pareto principle. This poses a clear challenge for the important task
of incorporating liberal political philosophies into the standard `Paretian'
economic framework for social evaluation.
2 Results
The set of individuals is N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng. For each individual i in N , the
real number xi denotes her disposable income (after government intervention)
and the real number mi denotes her market income (without government
intervention).2 Let x = (x1; x2; : : : ; xn) and m = (m1;m2; : : : ;mn). We
refer to a pair (x;m) as a social state.3 The set S = Rn  Rn collects all
social states. We assume that each individual ranks the social states in S
in accordance with her own disposable income. That is, individual i in N
weakly prefers social state (x;m) to social state (x0;m0) if and only if xi  x0i.
The aim is to compare social states on the basis of social welfare. A social
ranking R is a reexive and transitive binary relation in S. The asymmetric
and symmetric parts of R (`is at least as good as') are denoted by P (`is
better than') and I (`is equally good as').
We impose two principles on the social ranking. The rst principle ex-
presses respect for laissez-faire outcomes. Consider a social state that gives
each individual a disposable income equal to her market income. Laissez-faire
demands that any redistribution (that preserves total disposable income) is
regarded as a social worsening.
2Because of individual responses to government intervention, incomes `before' inter-
vention need not coincide with incomes `without' intervention. The latter are the ones
relevant for our purpose.
3For a social state (x;m), we allow total disposable income
P
i xi to be greater than,
equal to or smaller than total market income
P
imi. Note that the proofs of Theorems 1
and 2 still work if we impose, for each social state (x;m), that
P
i xi =
P
imi.
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Laissez-faire. For all social states (x;m) and (x0;m) in S such that
P
i xi =P
i x
0
i =
P
imi, if x = m and x
0 6= m, then (x;m)P (x0;m).
The second principle is a weak form of the Pareto principle. Weak Pareto
requires that an increase in the disposable income of every individual is re-
garded as a social improvement.
Weak Pareto. For all social states (x;m) and (x0;m0) in S, if xi > x0i for
each i in N , then (x;m)P (x0;m0).
Our main result says that the combination of laissez-faire and weak Pareto
forces the social ranking to maximize total disposable income.
Theorem 1. If a social ranking R satises laissez-faire and weak Pareto,
then, for all social states (x;m) and (x0;m0) in S,P
i xi >
P
i x
0
i implies (x;m)P (x
0;m0).
Proof. Let R satisfy laissez-faire and weak Pareto. Let (x;m) and (x0;m0)
be social states in S such that
P
i xi >
P
i x
0
i. We have to show that
(x;m)P (x0;m0). Let 1n be the n-vector with a one at each entry.
Assume rst that there is a positive real number  such that x = x0+1n.
Then we have (x;m)P (x0;m0) by weak Pareto.
Assume next that there is no positive real number  such that x = x0 +
1n. Let  be the positive real number for which
P
i xi  
P
i x
0
i = 2n.
By weak Pareto, we have
(x;m)P (x  1n; x  1n).
Note that
P
i(xi  ) =
P
i(x
0
i+ ) and, by the above assumption, x  1n 6=
x0 + 1n. Hence, by laissez-faire, we have
(x  1n; x  1n)P (x0 + 1n; x  1n).
By weak Pareto, we have
(x0 + 1n; x  1n)P (x0;m0).
Using transitivity, we obtain (x;m)P (x0;m0).
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Laissez-faire and weak Pareto are surprisingly demanding if imposed
jointly on a social ranking.4 Comparisons of social states with dierent total
disposable incomes must be made solely on the basis of total disposable in-
come. In all such comparisons, the social ranking must therefore ignore the
relationship between disposable incomes and market incomes. Proponents
of liberal political philosophies may nd this implication hard to swallow.
They may reject, for example, a policy that only marginally increases total
disposable income, but at the cost of a major shift of disposable incomes
away from market incomes.5
Next, we consider the implications of strengthening weak Pareto. The
`full' Pareto principle is usually dened as the combination of strong Pareto
and Pareto indierence. Strong Pareto demands that if the disposable income
of at least one individual increases and the disposable income of no individual
decreases, then this is deemed a social improvement.
Strong Pareto. For all social states (x;m) and (x0;m0) in S, if xi  x0i for
each i in N with at least one strict inequality, then (x;m)P (x0;m0).
Pareto indierence requires that if each individual is indierent between
two social states, i.e., has the same disposable income in both, then these
two social states are regarded as socially equally good.
Pareto indierence. For all social states (x;m) and (x0;m0) in S, if xi = x0i
for each i in N , then (x;m) I (x0;m0).
4The following example shows that there exist social rankings that satisfy laissez-faire
and weak Pareto. For each social state (x;m) in S, let v(x  m) denote the variance of
the vector x  m = (x1  m1; x2  m2; : : : ; xn  mn). Let R be the social ranking such
that, for all social states (x;m) and (x0;m0) in S, we have that (i) if
P
i xi >
P
i x
0
i, then
(x;m)P (x0;m0) and (ii) if
P
i xi =
P
i x
0
i, then (x;m)R (x
0;m0) if and only if v(x m) 
v(x0  m0). The (complete) social ranking R satises laissez-faire and weak Pareto.
5Consider an example with two individuals. Let (x;m) be such that x = m = (0; 100)
and let (x0;m) be such that x0 = (100 + "; 0) with " > 0. It is clear that in social state
(x0;m) the disposable incomes and market incomes are far apart. A mild extension of
laissez-faire would be that (x;m) should be socially preferred to (x0;m) for some small
" > 0. But Theorem 1 says that (x0;m)P (x;m) for each " > 0.
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A direct implication of Theorem 1 is that the combination of laissez-faire
and weak Pareto implies strong Pareto.
Corollary 1. If a social ranking R satises laissez-faire and weak Pareto,
then R satises strong Pareto.
Pareto indierence cannot, however, be combined with laissez-faire. Hence,
a social ranking that satises laissez-faire must violate the full Pareto prin-
ciple.
Theorem 2. There is no social ranking that satises laissez-faire and Pareto
indierence.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume that R is a social ranking that
satises laissez-faire and Pareto indierence.
Let x and x0 in Rn be such that
P
i xi =
P
i x
0
i and x 6= x0. We
have (x; x0) I (x; x) by Pareto indierence, (x; x)P (x0; x) by laissez-faire and
(x0; x) I (x0; x0) by Pareto indierence. Using transitivity, we obtain
(x; x0)P (x0; x0). But we have (x0; x0)P (x; x0) by laissez-faire.
To end this section, we discuss the relation between our results and a re-
sult by Kaplow and Shavell (2001), which states that a social ranking \that
is not purely welfarist violates the Pareto principle" (p. 284). Laissez-faire
makes the social ranking non-welfarist, as it makes it dependent on non-
preference information, viz., the market incomes. Nevertheless, it would be
a mistake to regard Theorem 2 as a mere implication of the result by Kaplow
and Shavell. What their result in fact shows is that a complete and continu-
ous6 social ranking that satises weak Pareto (which they identify with `the
Pareto principle') must satisfy Pareto indierence (which they identify with
`welfarism').7 Therefore, the result of Kaplow and Shavell concerns a rela-
tionship between two components of the full Pareto principle, whereas our
6A social ranking R satises continuity if, for all social states (x;m) and (y;m) in
S, if a sequence of vectors fykgk2N converges to y and (x;m)R (yk;m) (respectively,
(yk;m)R (x;m)) for each k in N, then (x;m)R (y;m) (respectively, (y;m)R (x;m)).
7See also the exchange between Fleurbaey, Tungodden and Chang (2003) and Kaplow
and Shavell (2004).
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results in Theorems 1 and 2 concern relationships between a component of
the full Pareto principle on the one hand and the (non-welfarist) laissez-faire
principle on the other hand.
3 Conclusion
The economic literature has traditionally stressed the role of laissez-faire as
an instrument for welfare maximization. Our results show the diculties in
treating the respect for laissez-faire outcomes as an end in itself. If the full
Pareto principle is required, then no social ranking can satisfy the laissez-
faire principle. If only weak Pareto is required, then there are possibilities,
but these are very restricted. In cases where the social states dier in total
disposable income, market incomes must be ignored and the social state with
greater total disposable income must be chosen, leaving little room for liberal
values.
We end with a digression on two taxation principles, viz., equal sacrice
and liberal reward. Interpret m as the pre-tax income distribution and x as
the post-tax income distribution. The question is how to divide the total
tax burden
P
imi  
P
i xi among the individuals. The equal sacrice prin-
ciple says that taxes should be such that each individual incurs the same
utility loss.8 Let u : R ! R be an increasing function, to be interpreted
as the common utility function. The equal sacrice principle demands that,
for all social states (x;m) and (x0;m) in S such that
P
i xi =
P
i x
0
i, if
u(x1)   u(m1) = u(x2)   u(m2) =    = u(xn)   u(mn) and x 6= x0, then
(x;m)P (x0;m). It is immediate that equal sacrice implies laissez-faire. In-
deed, equal sacrice implies that if the tax burden
P
imi  
P
i xi is zero
(the case laissez-faire deals with), then pre-tax income and post-tax income
should coincide.
The liberal reward principle says that, if individuals dier only with re-
spect to responsibility characteristics, then taxes should be such that each
8The equal sacrice principle was proposed by, among others, Mill (1848). See Musgrave
(1959) for a historical account. For modern uses of the principle, see, e.g., Young (1987,
1990) and Weinzierl (2014).
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individual incurs the same income loss.9 The liberal reward principle is ob-
tained from the equal sacrice principle by setting u equal to the identity
function. Again, provided we regard all individuals as equals with respect to
non-responsibility characteristics, liberal reward implies laissez-faire.
Both equal sacrice and liberal reward extend laissez-faire. By conse-
quence, our results are also relevant for the study of these principles. The
principles are dicult to incorporate into a social ranking together with the
natural requirement of the Pareto principle.10
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